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Abstract Critics have long dismissed paternalistic choice architecture as concep-
tually muddled at best and oxymoronic at worst. In this article, I argue that this
criticism remains true despite recent replies to the contrary. Further, I suggest that a
similar conceptual criticism also applies to non-paternalistic choice architecture.
This is due to a three-way tension between the effectiveness, avoidability, and
distinctiveness of each nudge. To illustrate this tension, I provide a novel expla-
nation of the mechanics of nudging and a taxonomy of these interventions. I then
argue that choice architects who defend the distinctiveness of nudging according to
how it guides our behaviour via our unreflective intuitive reasoning encounter a
trilemma because the distinctiveness of nudging hinges on interventions being both
avoidable and effective. Choice architects cannot achieve this aim without har-
nessing both our automatic and reflective systems of thought in tandem. However,
this diminishes the distinctive character of nudging by bringing it closer to other
traditional policy interventions. This establishes the choice architect’s trilemma: a
nudge is likely to be either ineffective, effective via some morally unaccept-
able means, or effective in a manner that is conceptually indistinct from other
evidence-based policy interventions.
Keywords Choice architecture  Freedom of choice  Manipulation  Nudge 
Paternalism
Cognitive psychologists and behavioural economists have long argued that our
everyday decision-making is not a uniform process. Rather, our decisions result
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from the interplay between automatic and reflective aspects of our will.1 The
relationship between these systems of thought is more complex than we often
acknowledge. We have far less awareness and control over our automatic reasoning
than we commonly assume and yet this automatic reasoning is responsible for a far
greater proportion of our behaviour than we usually realise (e.g. Kahneman and
Tversky 2000; Kahneman 2003, 2011).
This research provides policy-makers with a clearer picture of how traditional
policy interventions (such as incentive offers and coercive sanctions) change our
behaviour. This picture allows us to improve these policies to better reflect how
citizens actually make everyday decisions. However, this research has also informed
the development of novel techniques of policy intervention. The traditional carrots
and sticks offered by incentives and sanctions primarily appeal to our reflective
reasoning by offering us reasons for and against certain outcomes. As this mode of
thought is not the only one that we engage when making decisions, we can conceive
of a different type of policy that primarily influences us via our automatic reasoning
rather than our reflective reasoning. These policies will not provide us with explicit
reasons for action. Rather, they will prompt our intuitive thinking in order to guide
our behaviour. If these policies are effective then they are an important addition to
the policy-maker’s toolbox (Oliver 2013a).
One version of this form of policy-making has distinguished itself from its
relatives in recent years by purporting to offer a distinctive and appealing
combination of features. Defended most prominently by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein, this approach suggests that governments can nudge citizens towards
making better unreflective choices without restricting their freedom of choice.
According to Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge is any intervention to shape a decision-
making situation ‘…that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid’ (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009, p. 6).2
Sunstein and Thaler offer two distinct reasons for why the state may nudge
citizens’ behaviour (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1193). First, the state may
intervene in order to safeguard the well-being of the decision-maker. When the state
intervenes to increase the likelihood that citizens succeed according to their own
informed preferences, it acts on principles of libertarian paternalism.3 Alterna-
tively, the state may intervene in order to secure the well-being of third parties.
When the state intervenes to make it more likely that citizens will act to further the
1 Stanovitch and West (2000) famously label these choice-determining phenomena ‘System One’
(automatic) and ‘System Two’ (reflective) processes.
2 Sunstein and Thaler claim that a wide range of policy types fulfil this definition, including choice
prompts, selective information provision, information framing, de-biasing, default rules, and more.
3 Camerer et al. (2003) name this approach Asymmetric Paternalism.
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collective good or some other value of social justice, it acts according to principles
of libertarian benevolence.4
To illustrate this distinction, consider a well-known example:
Cafeteria – Alice is put in charge of a cafeteria at her institution. She must
make a multitude of decisions, including which foods to serve, which
ingredients to use, and in what order to arrange the meal choices. After a few
weeks in the job she notices that customers have a tendency to choose more of
the items that are presented earlier in the line.5
In Cafeteria, Alice notices a significant framing effect: her customers’ decisions
are shaped by how she presents the food to them. If Alice adopts a principle of
libertarian paternalism, she might present their food so that healthier or cheaper
products appear earlier in the line. Either of these alterations will increase the
likelihood that customers’ decisions will unreflectively align with their own
informed preferences toward those ends.6 Alternatively, Alice may adopt a principle
of libertarian benevolence and present the food so that fair-trade products or
products with a lower carbon footprint appear earlier in the line. Either of these
alterations will likely make it easier for customers to act in a socially just manner.
The distinction between these two policy types should be clear. Both approaches
conform to the basic principle of nudging—changing behaviour in a pre-
dictable fashion without restricting freedom of choice. For this reason, Sunstein
and Thaler attach to them the prefix libertarian. The important difference between
the two approaches lies in their stated aim. Libertarian benevolence is justified
according to improvements in the well-being of third parties (or some other value of
social justice) whereas libertarian paternalism is justified according to improve-
ments in the welfare of the individual affected.7
This distinction shows us that nudges are not distinctive due to their aim of
paternalising us or facilitating justice; most policy interventions do this. Rather,
nudges are distinctive due to their method of bringing about these outcomes.
Nudges distinguish themselves from other policy interventions by shaping our
decisions without restricting our freedom of choice. Nudges do not offer any explicit
incentives or threaten any significant costs. Rather, choice architects sidestep our
reason-responsive faculties and design choice situations in order to exploit everyday
4 Korobkin (2009) names this approach Libertarian Welfarism. Sunstein and Thaler suggest that this
approach justifies the state’s attempts ‘…to promote benevolence, and to assist vulnerable people, without
mandating behaviour in any way’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1193). Although libertarian paternalism
has received the lion’s share of attention, some have explored the possibility and attractiveness of
libertarian benevolence (Smith and McPherson 2009; Kelly 2013; Guala and Mittone 2015).
5 Adapted from Sunstein and Thaler (2003, p. 1164).
6 The truth of this claim depends on the preferences of Alice’s customers. If the majority of her
customers had informed preferences in favour of expensive unhealthy food, then Alice might present the
food differently.
7 This contrast ensures that libertarian benevolence promotes a far broader range of values than its
paternalistic sibling. As a result, these two justifications may conflict: policy interventions intended to
improve individual well-being may create externalities that decrease social utility and harm the collective
good. Conversely, policies that benefit the collective good may sacrifice the well-being of certain
individuals.
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‘Biases and Blunders’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, pp. 24–41) and ‘Behavioural
Market Failures’ (Sunstein 2014, pp. 34–50) that characterise our automatic
reasoning.8 As we can shape this form of reasoning without resorting to coercion,
proponents believe that choice architecture is often preferable to traditional
incentives and sanctions.
Debate over the permissibility of nudging has been hampered by a persistent and
troubling concern that tracks a general scepticism that nudging is conceptually
incoherent. Following Sunstein and Thaler, we can label this concern the Oxymoron
Objection.9 This objection has persisted for many years, leading some to champion
more conceptually robust behavioural interventions (Oliver 2013b, 2015; Grill
2014) and others to radically revise the nudge project in the hope of salvaging it
(Saghai 2013). Indeed, this objection is so persistent that Sunstein (2015, p. 514) has
come to accept the difficulty of general theoretical discussion of nudging, instead
imploring proponents to avoid the ‘trap of abstraction’ and to assess the plausibility
of each intervention on a case-by-case basis.
In this article, I explore the nature and scope of the oxymoron objection, explain
why it persists, and assess its troubling consequences for choice architects. I begin
by exploring the original form of the objection, which denies the compatibility
between libertarianism and paternalism. I illustrate the failures of various rebuttals
of this objection and argue that it continues to afflict paternalistic choice
architecture. I then identify a broader novel form of the oxymoron objection that
denies that nudging can simultaneously be effective, avoidable, and distinctive. I
argue that the tension between these three characteristics supports the scepticism
that even non-paternalistic nudges require further conceptual clarity. I conclude by
assessing the difficulty that proponents face in resolving this trilemma and sketching
out its likely consequences.
Is Libertarian Paternalism Still an Oxymoron?
In this section, I explore the original version of the oxymoron objection in order to
identify the traditional source of conceptual confusion concerning nudges. This
version of the objection is motivational as it concerns the compatibility of the
libertarian elements of choice architecture with paternalism. According to this
worry, the paternalistic justification for nudging is oxymoronic because interven-
tions that aim to be libertarian cannot also be paternalistic.
There are two prominent responses to this objection. First, Sunstein and Thaler
(2003, 2009, pp. 5–12) argue that there is nothing oxymoronic about achieving
paternalistic ends via libertarian means. The libertarian state minimises the amount
of coercion that it imposes on its citizens (e.g. Hayek [1960] 2006, pp. 11–20;
Nozick 1974, pp. 26–28). Nudges are compatible with this aim because they are not
8 These aspects of our psyche include anchoring, attribute shrouding, the availability heuristic, framing,
loss aversion, the representativeness heuristic, status quo bias, irrational temporal discounting, and
unrealistic optimism.
9 See also Mitchell (2005).
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coercive. Rather, they purport to improve our decisions without restricting our
freedom of choice. Thus, nudging is compatible with a libertarian respect for
freedom even if we nudge for paternalistic reasons.
This response faces a clear problem: libertarianism is not simply a claim about
the means by which states act; it is also a claim about the sorts of policies that states
choose to pursue. A principled stance against coercion is not the ultimate goal of
libertarianism. Rather, the libertarian state protects certain core rights and freedoms
of its citizens (e.g. rights of self-ownership). The concern with coercion that
Sunstein and Thaler identify is symptomatic of this more fundamental cause
because the need to protect core rights leads the libertarian state to avoid
unnecessary coercion. So long as citizens can enjoy their rights while respecting the
rights of others, then the libertarian state has little reason to intervene more
intrusively in order to make further decisions on behalf of citizens. The libertarian
state only intervenes to secure core rights and protect against their transgression.
This upstream focus on protecting core rights and freedoms ensures that
paternalistic interference is unnecessary (and thus objectionable) to libertarians
(Wall 2009).10 Libertarians believe that improvements in individual welfare are not
sufficient justification for state intervention regardless of the means of that
intervention. Libertarianism cannot consistently generate the reasons required to
motivate paternalistic interference from its own basic principles. Therefore,
paternalistic nudging cannot be justified on libertarian grounds. The libertarian
state is a nightwatchman rather than a nanny.
Second, Sunstein (2014) provides an alternative defence of libertarian paternal-
ism when he argues that the cognitive improvements that result from counteracting
our blunders, biases, and behavioural market failures should fall within the
legitimate scope of the libertarian state. These interventions improve choices in line
with the wishes of decision-makers. Thus, if libertarians aim to ensure that citizens
can enjoy their rights as they wish (consistent with the minimal infringement of the
rights of others) then libertarian paternalism can improve the choices of citizens in
line with this requirement.
He argues for this possibility through a pair of distinctions. First, we should
distinguish between hard and soft paternalism (Sunstein 2014, p. 58). Hard
paternalism promotes individual well-being by imposing material costs on
individual decision-making. In contrast, soft paternalism imposes non-material
costs on individual decision-making.11 While this distinction will often be a matter
of degree, fines and taxes are clear examples of the former while default options and
information framing are obvious examples of the latter. Second, we should
distinguish between means and ends paternalism (Sunstein 2014, pp. 61–71). Means
paternalism facilitates our pursuit of our own conception of the good. In contrast,
ends paternalism directly improves the content of our conception of the good.
10 For criticism concerning the likely anti-libertarian redistributive effects of nudging, see Mitchell
(2005, pp. 1269–1275).
11 Sunstein’s use of this distinction differs from the traditional distinction between hard and soft
paternalism coined by Joel Feinberg (1986, p. 15). Feinberg distinguishes between influencing voluntary
and non-voluntary decisions.
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These two distinctions complement each other: the first (between hard and soft
paternalism) distinguishes between methods of interference while the second
(between means and ends paternalism) distinguishes between the aims of
interference. When evidence suggests that policy-makers could improve people’s
lives through soft-means paternalism, then libertarian paternalism suggests that they
should do so. This permission is supposedly granted by the fact that soft-means
paternalism allows individuals to more easily pursue their own conceptions of the
good (means paternalism) without imposing significant material costs on themselves
and others (soft paternalism). Paternalistic choice architecture should possess these
characteristics, and interventions that possess these characteristics secure freedom
of choice rather than undermine it. From this, Sunstein concludes that the very
possibility of soft-means paternalism illustrates the compatibility between libertar-
ianism and paternalism.
This response improves on the original rebuttal of the oxymoron objection
because it speaks to both the aims and means of libertarianism. However, even if we
assume that this response does succeed in linking libertarianism to paternalism
where the prior argument fails, it still faces important objections from both anti-
paternalists and paternalists.
On one hand, anti-paternalists may reject the distinction between ends and means
paternalism as implausible. To see this, imagine that you are required to design a
policy to improve the financial decisions of Alice and her co-worker Brian.
Evidence suggests that you could design the architecture of a decision that both
Alice and Brian regularly make so that it is more likely that both colleagues will
save more of their money. This intervention helps miserly Alice because she values
saving for its own sake. This intervention also helps risk-averse Brian because,
although he does not value saving for its own sake, Brian does value saving as a
means of protecting his future prospects against the risk of redundancy.
In this situation, saving is both an end in itself for Alice and, simultaneously, a
means to some other end for Brian. This difference between Alice and Brian’s
conceptions of the good ensures that any intervention to change their saving habits
will affect them differently. On a standard reading of the case, our interference with
Alice’s ends will incur a larger justificatory burden than our interference with
Brian’s means. This is because Alice’s ends are more morally weighty than Brian’s
means (ceteris paribus).
Sunstein’s move toward means paternalism acknowledges this important
difference in the justificatory burdens generated by each intervention. Problems
arise, however, when we acknowledge this moral fact in the light of the vast
heterogeneity of conceptions of the good held by citizens residing in modern liberal
societies. This heterogeneity makes it difficult for the state to know when a policy
intrudes upon a decision concerning our ends or our means. Sunstein believes that
principles of libertarian paternalism can justify the state intervening in order to
improve Brian’s life. Nevertheless, many policies designed to affect Brian’s choices
will also affect Alice’s choices, and affecting Alice’s choices is a more morally
weighty endeavour to justify. Because of this, the state should act according to the
belief that every soft-means paternalistic intervention may also be a form of soft-
ends paternalism for some other person. Thus, the claim that the libertarian
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paternalist state is permitted to pursue soft-means paternalism has little practical
payoff in the face of epistemic uncertainty and social diversity.12
In light of this problem, anti-paternalists should insist that proving the mere
conceptual possibility of means paternalism does not resolve the difficulty of
isolating it from its more morally troubling sibling in real-world cases. Given the
facts on the ground, proponents must change defensive tack and provide a
normative justification of ends paternalism from deeper libertarian principles. As we
have seen, this will require proponents to weigh up the moral harm of frustrating the
rights of some citizens (like Alice) in order to facilitate other citizens (like Brian) in
their enjoyment of their rights. This is the challenge awaiting those who seek to
defend soft-means paternalism as a legitimate goal of libertarian policy-making.
Choice architects might respond to this challenge by appealing to the non-
intrusive nature of soft-paternalism. Even if an intervention that is intended to be an
instance of means paternalism backfires and transforms into an instance of ends
paternalism, the intervention will not impose any significant material costs on those
affected. Because of this, any resulting ends paternalism will not significantly
restrict our freedom of choice and should be easily avoided. If Alice changes her
mind and comes to doubt the value of saving as an end in itself, she will not be
significantly frustrated in her pursuit of the good when her financial decisions are
shaped as a side effect of the paternalism aimed at Brian.
Troublingly, this response fails to recognise that a constraint need not be weak
just because it is non-material. The scorn of my peers may be far more damaging to
me than any fine or financial penalty. As J. S. Mill famously notes, this scorn can
leave us fewer means of escape and penetrate much more deeply into the details of
our lives (Mill [1859] 1991, p. 9). This should lead us to conclude that Sunstein’s
defence of the soundness of libertarian paternalism cannot evade the oxymoron
objection by relying on the possibility of soft-means paternalism. Anti-paternalists
can object that relying on these distinctions underestimates the epistemic difficulties
involved in targeting means paternalism in a diverse society, and the possible
harshness of so-called soft-paternalism.
On the other hand, paternalists may challenge the paternalistic credentials of soft-
means paternalism (e.g. Conly 2013; Arneson 2015). Accept for a moment that the
above objection can be resolved and that we can plausibly distinguish between
means and ends paternalism in a useful way. By doing so, we accept that a state may
act for paternalistic reasons to help citizens live better lives. Paternalists may then
ask whether such policies really are effective in achieving their paternalistic ends.
By leaving imprudent options available and instead relying on our (suitably
influenced) cognitive biases to lead our decisions away from these options, nudges
seem poorly suited to paternalistically improving our lives in many important cases.
12 To minimise the risk of ends paternalism, the state must close the epistemic gap in order to better
understand the structure of our preferences. However, this will be difficult for two reasons. First, it will
require our preferences to be more transparent to observers than some suggest is possible (e.g. Rebonato
2012, pp. 153–163; White 2013, pp. 69–80). Second, it will require a large-scale invasion of privacy in
order to collect the necessary information about our conceptions of the good (Kapsner and Sandfuchs
2015). Overcoming these difficulties will be an onerous task. Yet if choice architects cannot overcome
these difficulties, the distinction between means paternalism and ends paternalism is of little practical use.
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For example, irrational acts backed by strong motivations to act irrationally are
likely to overcome nudges (Conly 2013, pp. 31–32). Sunstein’s move towards soft-
means paternalism exacerbates this concern. By reducing the scope of permissible
nudging to soft-means paternalism, Sunstein effectively increases our opportunities
for error and devalues nudging as an effective form of paternalism. Consequently,
those with an appetite for effective paternalism are likely to look elsewhere for
solutions to our poor decision-making (e.g. Conly 2013, pp. 29–33).
This gives us a second reason to think that Sunstein’s response fails to rebut the
oxymoron objection: even if it were true that we can isolate incidents of soft-means
paternalism, such interventions may be too harsh and broad for anti-paternalists and
too weak and narrow for paternalists.13 These objections show that the defence of
libertarian paternalism as a conceptually coherent project still has some way left to
go. No response to the oxymoron objection against libertarian paternalism can rely
on the supposed compatibility between libertarian methods and paternalistic aims.
Rather, it must explain how paternalistic aims can be squared with deeper libertarian
principles in order to fully respond to the objection. Drawing a distinction between
ends and means paternalism cannot achieve this goal because this distinction raises
a pair of further objections. Either libertarian paternalism’s reliance on means
paternalism is implausible (because means paternalism is inseparable from ends
paternalism in practice), or this distinction is plausible but the soft-means
paternalism that it produces is unsavoury for both sides of the paternalism debate.
As neither of these conclusions is an attractive one for libertarian paternalists to
draw, we should conclude that the oxymoron objection continues to loom large over
paternalistic choice architecture.
Understanding the Mechanics of Nudging
In the previous section, I identified and explored the traditional conceptual objection
against nudging. That such a fundamental challenge to the coherence of libertarian
paternalism continues to persist should raise alarms. Yet the persistence of this
version of the oxymoron objection is not fatal to the overall nudge project so long as
some nudges evade it. We saw at the outset that libertarian paternalism does not
exhaust the possible justifications for nudging. This will lead some choice architects
to look to libertarian benevolence in the hopes of escaping the oxymoron objection.
In what follows, I argue that this strategy is misguided because we can identify a
different version of the oxymoron objection that more broadly afflicts both
paternalistic and non-paternalistic choice architecture. This mechanical objection
concerns how nudges work rather than the compatibility of their conflicting
motivating principles. It suggests that the mechanisms of psychological influence
used by choice architects to shape our behaviour guarantee that most interventions
cannot be simultaneously effective, avoidable, and distinctive. Due to its tripartite
13 As Sarah Conly notes, when we see libertarian paternalism in this light it appears to suffer ‘…the
worst of both worlds’ (2013, p. 8) by ‘…neither having its cake nor eating it’ (2013, p. 32).
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nature, I label this tension at the heart of the nudge project the Choice Architect’s
Trilemma.
This tension differs from the conflicting motivations of libertarian paternalism.
Identifying it is a tricky task, however, due to the under-defined nature of nudging.
The boundaries between what counts as a nudge and what does not have long been a
point of contention. Indeed, Sunstein’s recent warnings about the trap of abstraction
follow directly from the minimal classifying conditions that much of the debate over
nudging operates with. Many phenomena predictably alter our behaviour without
resorting to incentives or sanctions. Further definition is required in order to provide
a satisfactory depth of analysis and guarantee the compatibility of our arguments.
Therefore, we must first provide further detail on how nudges function before
seeking to understand the basis of this trilemma. In this section, I propose one
possible model of how nudges function. This discussion is partly speculative and I
accept the attractiveness of alternative possible explanations. However, further
detail is required to identify this troubling tension and the following explanation is
one way of clearly illustrating it.
Consider the main insight that choice architects draw upon when designing
policies—the simple fact that we cannot consciously submit every decision that we
make to a reasonably informed cost–benefit analysis. Rather, we must follow our
gut instinct, rely on emotional insights, and internalise a whole host of heuristics in
order to get by.
Much of our behaviour is governed by automatic intuitive thought that exists
somewhere between direct perception and full-blown reflective judgement. The
balance between our intuitive and reflective systems of thought is largely regulated
by: (a) the amount of attention required to access both systems, and (b) the amount
of effort required for either system to function.14 Conscious reflective judgements
demand greater attention and effort than automatic intuitive reactions, which is why
we tend to rely on the latter to guide much of our everyday behaviour.15 However,
our attention is limited and our intuitive reactions are often habitually determined.
This makes them difficult to control or modify upon reflection.
These features determine the basic relationship between our two systems of
thought: we must reflectively monitor and correct our intuitive reactions, yet the
reflective judgements required for this monitoring and correction demand greater
attention and effort than their intuitive siblings. Each of us instinctively understands
this basic relationship of give and take between our systems of thought, and we tend
to succeed in employing both systems advantageously. Although bad habits and
mistakes in decision-making are common, each of us can recognise the prudence in
prioritising our reflective efforts toward more important decisions where possible.
The finite nature of our cognitive capacities imposes this limitation on us by
making our attention and effort prized resources that we cannot expend infinitely.
Our decisions are subject to cognitive scarcity. We must decide (where possible)
14 For discussion of the diversity of attentional functions and a defence of its selective qualities, see Wu
(2014).
15 This insight also explains why intuitive processes coexist more easily than reflective processes, which
often disrupt each other (Kahneman 2003, p. 1451).
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when best to employ these resources, which decisions to reflectively monitor and
correct, and which not to. This trade-off imposes an opportunity cost on our
decision-making. Conscious reflection on one choice leaves us less likely to be able
to reflect on another choice because we have less effort to expend on it, less
attention to pay to it, and less time to give it our consideration. Ignoring this trade-
off and trying to do too much risks distraction, cognitive overload, and exhaustion.
This trade-off creates an important crowding-out effect in our psychology: when
a decision requires too much attention, effort, or time to monitor and correct, then
our reflective system cannot function as it otherwise would. Some reflective
decisions require more attention and effort than we can give them due to our
circumstances. When this happens, we are left to rely on our intuitive thought as our
only effective guide. Because the opportunity cost in question results from the
competition between different modes of thought for the same finite cognitive
resources, let us refer to it as a Friction Cost.
Friction costs arise whenever our systems of thought compete for the same
limited mental reserves rather than working together harmoniously to inform our
decision-making. Every decision that we make is subject to possible friction costs
and, as noted, we commonly negotiate these costs without significantly damaging
our prospects. Many factors inform this cost, including time pressures, the number
of concurrent reflective tasks, our experience and practice at the task in hand, and
our mood (Kahneman 2003, p. 1467). Each one of these factors can divert our
attention and make reflective judgements more effortful.
One possible way of understanding the distinctive character of nudging is to
argue that choice architects intentionally impose friction costs on decision-makers in
order to shape their behaviour. Choice architecture can improve our unreflective
choices by nudging us toward certain beneficial outcomes by imposing friction costs
on us to make both (a) certain intuitive outcomes, and (b) the process of reflective
monitoring and self-correction itself more psychologically costly than they would
otherwise be. For example, we incur friction costs when we seek to reflect upon our
apparent eagerness to pick up the healthier lunch options in the cafeteria or to select
the savings plan that appears most beneficial to us when we are considering our
future financial prospects. When we lack the attention, effort, or inclination to
reflect on our intuitive reactions (perhaps because we are in a rush to sate our hunger
or know little about financial risks), then we are more likely to rely on a nudge and
so policy-makers are better able to shape our behaviour without resorting to
coercion.
Sunstein and Thaler’s call to employ our everyday blunders and biases as
intuitive levers of thought in policy-making is an acknowledgement of the nature
and utility of friction costs. By imposing these costs in particular ways toward
particular goals, policy-makers may reduce the likelihood that we reflectively
monitor and self-correct our behaviour, and make it more likely that when we rely
on our intuitive system of thought for guidance we benefit from doing so. As the
latter system of thought is more easily (non-coercively) manipulated than the
former, the inventive use of friction costs promises to allow policy-makers to
change our behaviour for the better without coercively prohibiting particular
actions. As we have seen, this is the basic principle of nudging. Thus, I suggest that
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we can conceivably understand the distinctive nature of nudging through what I
have named friction costs.
Establishing the Trilemma
The use of friction costs as a policy tool illustrates a second broader conceptual
objection to nudging. Policy-makers can increase the effectiveness of their nudges
by selectively imposing friction costs on our decision-making. However, greater
friction costs make it more likely that we will automatically comply with a policy.16
This is because the larger the friction costs imposed by a policy, the more attention
and effort we require to respond reflectively to its effect, and thus the less likely it is
that we will be able to do so. Some nudges gain their effectiveness by constraining
our reflective choices. However, by definition, nudges should not impose significant
costs on our reflective decision-making because they must be cheap and easy to
avoid. Choice architecture’s fabled ability to change our behaviour in a relatively
benign manner is famously central to its distinctive attractiveness.
Our initial study of the mechanisms of nudging highlights a tension between
these two claims. Nudges guide our decisions by imposing friction costs on us. By
doing so, nudges make it more likely that our systems of thought will compete
rather than cooperate (due to cognitive scarcity). Nudges are distinctive because
proponents claim that they are both effective and avoidable. However, effectiveness
requires choice architects to influence our intuitive choices and avoidability requires
decision-makers to have reflective choices. Yet one of these often comes at the cost
of crowding out the other due to the friction costs involved. Choice architects will
either shape our decisions to make reflective judgement less likely and intuitive
thought more beneficial, or they will shape our decisions to make reflective
judgement more likely and intuitive thought less beneficial. They cannot do both in
each individual instance.
Something must give—the nature of friction costs makes it likely that nudging is
less effective, less avoidable, or less distinctive than it at first appears. In what
remains, I test this hypothesis. I distinguish between three types of nudge that
employ friction costs in different ways. I then propose a problem for each type of
nudge. If each problem proves accurate then we must conclude that any defence of
nudging as a distinctive, effective, and avoidable form of policy-making is
conceptually flawed and potentially oxymoronic.
16 This general relationship will not hold in all circumstances. First, if friction costs increase to the point
of exhaustion then a nudge will fail if the person cannot decide at all. Second, large friction costs may
draw attention to covert nudges, possibly diminishing their effectiveness. Much of the interplay between
these effects will be contextually determined, which is why I restrict my analysis to the study of
likelihoods rather than causal certainties.
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Acute Nudges and the Problem of Avoidance
I have suggested that understanding how policy-makers employ friction costs to
shape our behaviour is a plausible way to understand the distinctive character of
nudging. In this section, I explore the problem facing nudges that impose friction
costs in a way that crowds out our reflective reasoning. Returning to Thaler and
Sunstein’s initial definition, we see that nudges should shape our decision-making
situation towards some predictable end without forbidding options or significantly
changing our economic incentives. The resulting intervention must be easy and
cheap to avoid (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, p. 6).17 One way of fulfilling this
definition is to change our decision-making behaviour solely through shaping our
automatic intuitive decisions. These interventions are maximally distinctive from
traditional incentives and sanctions because they seek to change our behaviour
through purely intuitive means. For this reason, let us label this sub-class of
interventions Acute Nudges.
In order to shape our decisions via purely intuitive means, acute nudges must
separate out our two systems of thought. Choice architects can achieve this by
imposing friction costs that are large enough to guarantee that we lack the effort or
attention required to reflectively judge between options in the context of our
decisions. If this intervention is successful, it will fully crowd out our reflective
judgements concerning the decision at hand and leave us to decide intuitively or not
at all. Having crowded out our reflective reasoning, acute nudges then exploit our
heuristics and biases to guide our intuitive behaviour towards a particular outcome.
Instances of choice architecture that impose significantly high friction costs on
our reflective reasoning will qualify as acute nudges. These interventions are most
likely to succeed in circumstances when reflective monitoring and correction is
already difficult. Examples of such interventions include successful priming effects
that use unconscious influences to make certain decisions more likely, default rules
acting as safety nets in complex and time-sensitive decisions, and the intentional
framing of emotive and unfamiliar information under circumstances of clear risk or
danger (such as medical circumstances). In these cases, salient circumstantial
factors already impose large psychological costs on our reflective reasoning. Acute
nudges will likely exploit and exaggerate these background factors to bypass our
reflective system, leaving decision-makers to rely on the nudge towards a specific
outcome.
We should expect acute nudges to be relatively rare. This small group of
interventions remains significant, however, because these interventions provide us
with the clearest illustration of the tension between, on the one hand, distinctiveness
and effectiveness, and on the other hand, avoidability. Acute nudges are distinctive
because they shape our behaviour through purely intuitive means. To do this
effectively, a nudge must crowd out the reflective monitoring and self-correction
17 See also: ‘We do not have a clear definition of ‘‘easily avoided’’…. It would be arbitrary and a bit
ridiculous to offer an inflexible rule to specify when costs are high enough to disqualify a policy as
libertarian, but the precise question of degree is not really important. Let us simply say that we want those
costs to be small’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, p. 249).
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required for decision-makers to wilfully avoid a nudge if they wish. We can name
this concern the Problem of Avoidance.
The problem of avoidance is not the traditional concern over whether nudges are
coercive or not. Acute nudges do not coercively remove options or threaten any
significant financial costs. Indeed, these polices will not provide decision-makers
with reasons at all because they seek to crowd out our reflective thought (rendering
simultaneous incentives or sanctions self-defeating). We can escape the effects of
acute nudges more easily than standard coercive interventions for this reason. For
example, we will resist an acute nudge in cases where the intervention crowds out
our reflective reasoning but our instinctive behaviour is too firmly established by our
habits to be changed. In these cases, acute nudges will fail to change our behaviour
in a way that coercion would have successfully changed. Here we can see the
difference between acute nudges and coercive sanctions—friction costs prohibit the
reflective pursuit of decision outcomes rather than simply removing that option from
the table. Acute nudges make it more difficult to reflect on outcomes but not
necessarily more difficult to pursue them.
This difference suggests that the problem of avoidance is narrower than the
problem of coercion. Our worry stems from the fact that non-reflective avoidance
arises by chance (e.g. when our intuitive behaviour is habitual rather than chosen on
reflection). Acute nudges may be effective and distinctive. However, they prevent
the reflective act of will required for a decision-maker to avoid the nudge
consciously and wilfully. Therefore, acute nudges do not restrict our freedom of
choice simpliciter. They do not prevent us from completing certain actions or
pursuing particular opportunities. Indeed, in some lucky cases, we can avoid them.
However, acute nudges do restrict our freedom of reflective choice and prevent us
from reflectively deciding to act in these ways. Our reflective decision-making is
constrained by the large friction costs imposed on us and we are unable to avoid the
intervention wilfully.
According to the problem of avoidance, we can object that the significantly high
friction costs imposed by acute nudges make it unreasonably difficult for decision-
makers to reflectively monitor and correct their behaviour. The choice architecture
in question makes it too psychologically costly for us to do so given our finite
psychological resources. When policy-makers employ friction costs so large that
they prevent us from reflecting in this manner, their interventions constrain an
important part of our freedom of choice by rendering us unfree to engage in
reflective reasoning.18
The problem of avoidance offers us an important insight. By conflating freedom
of choice with the freedom to choose reflectively, choice architects suggest that
effective nudges are avoidable because they do not coerce. Our study of acute
nudges shows that an intervention can be avoidable without being wilfully avoidable
(e.g. by only being avoidable through chance). This distinction explains why
proponents cannot simply rely on the presence of opt-out opportunities as a way of
18 This raises a further concern that acute nudges threaten our personal autonomy by constraining our
reflective acts of will. While it is true that many nudges are compatible with our autonomy (Wilkinson
2013; Blumenthal-Barby 2013; Hanna 2015; Mills 2015), so-called acute nudges are not for this very
reason.
The Choice Architect’s Trilemma
123
securing avoidability. Interventions can constrain our decision-making even when
they provide us with an opportunity to opt-out. If that opportunity requires too much
attention and effort for us to use, then we cannot make wilful use of that opt-out
even when it is offered to us.19
While acute nudges are extreme cases, the fact that friction costs can be so large
that they crowd out our reflective reasoning shows us how any nudge can constrain
our reflective decision-making to some extent. The more a nudge leverages our
automatic reasoning, the more difficult it is for us to avoid it wilfully because the
leveraging makes reflective choice more psychologically costly. The resulting
problem of avoidance establishes the first horn of the choice architect’s trilemma:
some nudges impose friction costs that are large enough to crowd out our reflective
reasoning. The resulting nudges are effective and distinctive, but they are difficult to
avoid as they undermine our freedom of reflective choice.
Dual-System Nudges and the Problem of Distinctiveness
The problem of avoidance suggests that it will be difficult to wilfully avoid nudges
that seek to be both distinctive and effective. This problem afflicts a small number
of interventions that possess a morally troubling character. For this reason, choice
architects may happily dismiss acute nudges as failing to fulfil the definition of a
nudge. According to that definition, nudges should not be costly in the way that
acute nudges are. Choice architects can deny that nudges must crowd out our
reflective reasoning and instead suggest that nudges can shape our behaviour by
leveraging both intuitive and reflective reasoning in tandem. These interventions
will impose smaller friction costs on decision-makers than acute nudges because
they do not seek to crowd out reflective thought entirely. Rather, they have the aim
of guiding our intuitive reactions towards a particular decision outcome and then
prompting us to reflectively endorse these reactions to secure the outcome in
question. This form of choice architecture will not bypass or quell our reflective
capacities. Rather, it will harness both systems of thought together. Because these
policies attempt to shape our decisions by leveraging both systems of thought, let us
name these interventions Dual-System Nudges.
As these interventions impose lower psychological costs than acute nudges, we
might expect dual-system nudges to be perhaps the most common type of nudge.
For example, we can classify many of the common cases discussed in the literature
in this way (such as better feedback and incentive schemes). Nearly all social
nudges (such as the famous ‘Don’t Mess with Texas’ slogan) can be classified in
this way. Examples of dual-system nudges include interventions that make certain
reasons relatively more appealing by framing an offer in a more attractive light or
by clarifying a threat in an especially salient manner. Although these interventions
do impose traditional costs on decision-makers, they still fulfil Thaler and
19 Riccardo Rebonato (2012, pp. 8–9) explains this problem by distinguishing between nominal and real
freedom of choice. Rebonato argues that nudges only protect our nominal freedom of choice (with an opt-
out condition) at the cost of our real freedom of choice (which is restricted by the success of the policy).
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Sunstein’s initial definition because these costs are low enough to avoid counting as
coercion or significant economic costs. Instead, they can impose a range of mild
psychological, social, or economic costs in order to shape our behaviour. So long as
these policies impose friction costs to emphasise the intuitive features of the
traditional threat or offer in question, then proponents may defend them as nudges.
We find an example of this strategy in Yashar Saghai’s (2013) revisionary
defence of nudging. Sagahi seeks to secure a morally robust form of freedom of
choice when designing choice architecture. According to Saghai (2013, p. 489), a
nudge preserves our freedom of choice when: (1) it preserves our choice set, and (2)
it is fully or substantially non-controlling. These conditions are distinctive and
secure avoidability, but we might worry that Saghai’s nudges lack the power to be
effective. How could an intentionally non-controlling choice-preserving interven-
tion guide our decision-making towards a beneficial outcome? To resolve this
concern, Saghai defines effectiveness in terms of leveraging both systems of thought
up to (but excluding) ‘full-blown deliberation’.20
Rather than exclusively leveraging our automatic reasoning to secure policy
goals (like an acute nudge), Saghai’s nudges leverage both our automatic and
reflective reasoning in tandem. This revision dissolves the tension between
effectiveness and avoidability that afflicts acute nudges by changing the terms of
effectiveness. This strategy allows Saghai to defend what I have labelled dual-
system nudging. This defence is realistic and attractive for a number of reasons.
Chief among them is that dual-system nudges avoid the moral concerns facing acute
nudges over freedom of reflective choice.21 However, assuming that dual-system
nudges are effective at changing our behaviour, critics might worry that Saghai’s
revision erodes the distinctiveness of nudging. Let us call this the Problem of
Distinctiveness.
According to this objection, nearly all sensible evidence-based policy-making
that is sensitive to realistic human decision-making will seek to leverage both of our
systems of thought together. This approach is not novel. Successful policy-makers
know that both what they offer (or threaten) and how they make that offer (or threat)
matter to the likelihood of success. Few seek to limit themselves to just one method
of influence. They can design incentives that both significantly change the payoffs
of our options and that frame this offer in a way that appears intuitively attractive.
However, these incentives are not nudges in any distinctive sense. What makes
choice architecture distinctive is how it imposes friction costs to achieve policy
goals. The problem of distinctiveness suggests that dual-system nudges impose
these costs in the same way that most other successful policies do.
20 For example: ‘In fact, all nudges rely on what I call ‘‘shallow cognitive processes’’. I will use the term
to cover both nondeliberative and incompletely deliberative processes that share three properties: (1) they
are fast; (2) the ‘‘cognitive miser’’ is inclined to rely on them because they consume few resources; (3)
they yield responses that are not the result of full-blown deliberation (ie, the exploration of a broad, if not
always exhaustive, range of hypotheses for solving a problem)’ (Saghai 2013, p. 489).
21 Additionally, because dual-system nudges provide reasons in an intuitively compelling manner,
proponents might hope that dual-system nudges are better equipped to produce sustainable long-term
behaviour change than acute nudges.
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While Sunstein and Thaler’s arguments trade on the competition between
automatic and reflective reasoning to derive a novel policy approach, Saghai’s
argument trades away this relationship in the hope of proving some behaviourally-
informed policies to be both effective and avoidable. To the extent that he succeeds
in his task, his arguments encounter a different concern that should be instructive to
any choice architect: nudges that impose significantly high friction costs threaten
our capacity for wilful avoidance while nudges that impose relatively lower friction
costs threaten to lose their distinctive character.
Most policy interventions seek to be both intuitively appealing and attractive
upon reflection. To distinguish themselves from other evidence-based policy
approaches in the manner that Sunstein and Thaler intend, nudges must wield
friction costs in a distinctive manner while protecting freedom of choice. If they
cannot do this, then nudges risk becoming indistinguishable from other traditional
policies that match how people actually make decisions. This problem of
distinctiveness establishes the second horn of the choice architect’s trilemma:
some nudges impose friction costs that are small enough to leverage both reflective
and intuitive systems of thought without one crowding out and dominating the
other. The resulting policies are effective and wilfully avoidable, but the goal of
making reasons intuitively appealing is not novel. As a result, dual-system nudging
appears to be a label that is so broad as to be indistinct.
Dual-Goal Nudges and the Problem of Effectiveness
Choice architects can respond to the problem of distinctiveness in one of two ways.
First, they may increase the friction costs imposed on decision-makers. This
distinguishes nudging from traditional interventions at the cost of re-stoking the
problem of avoidance. Second, they may change the way that they are imposing
their mild friction costs. Policy-makers cannot reduce friction costs to zero and still
claim to be nudging citizens toward better choice outcomes.22 However, they can
employ the mild costs used by dual-system nudges to guide our two systems of
thought in different directions rather than guiding our two systems of thought
towards one outcome in tandem. Choice architects may design interventions that
guide our intuitive reactions towards a desirable outcome while simultaneously
prompting us to reflect on whether we endorse this outcome or would prefer to exit.
These interventions will guarantee that decision-makers possess both an opportunity
to opt out wilfully and the necessary means to make use of that opportunity. Given
these divergent goals, let us name these interventions Dual-Goal Nudges.
Examples of dual-goal nudges include active choice prompts and explicit
debiasing. These interventions use friction costs to separate out our two systems of
thought and encourage one to reflect on the other. Rather than imposing these costs
in order to dominate one system with another, dual-goal nudges trigger both systems
22 A response that rejected the use of friction costs entirely would be a move away from nudging towards
more traditional sanctions and incentives.
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of thought in order to simultaneously lead us toward some desired outcome and
prompt us to reflect on whether we would prefer to avoid that outcome.
By using friction costs in this way, these policies distinctively emphasise the
decision-maker’s capacity for exit, and are thus more wilfully avoidable than acute
nudges. Further, this dual-goal use of friction costs is more distinctive than dual-
system nudges. However, the Janus-faced nature of dual-goal nudges raises
questions over their effectiveness. If an intervention imposes mild friction costs in
order to lead decision-makers both towards and away from policy outcomes, then it
remains unclear whether that policy effectively guides the ‘decision-makers’
behaviour at all. These policies use the distinctive mechanisms of friction costs in
order to secure avoidability. But in doing so, they appear to lose their effectiveness.
Let us call this concern the Problem of Effectiveness.
Choice architects may respond to this problem by arguing that dual-goal nudges
lead us towards policy outcomes in the most morally acceptable manner. Although
engaging people’s deliberative capacities can be psychologically costly to them, it is
necessary in order to treat them as rational agents. The argument continues that this
morally constrained form of effectiveness is the only one worth its name, and thus
policy-makers should not desire to impose greater friction costs than these. While
this response is certainly admirable, it ignores the quandary at hand. The mere use
of friction costs is not the same as the effective use of friction costs, and the
employment of friction costs to guide decision-makers towards two opposing
outcomes is an ineffective use of those costs when the effects of both costs cancel
each other out. Critics may reasonably suggest that an intuitive pull towards a policy
goal and a simultaneous reflective push toward the exit offers no overall benefit to
our decision-making. Although these policies use two different means of influencing
us towards two different goals, it remains unclear whether either force brings us any
closer to a decision. Indeed, many dual-goal nudges will simply increase the
psychological costs of decision-making by bringing choosers closer to cognitive
overload without bringing them closer to a beneficial outcome. For this reason,
critics may dismiss dual-goal nudges as ineffective.
The problem of effectiveness establishes the third horn of the choice architect’s
trilemma: dual-goal nudges impose friction costs that are small enough to leverage
both systems of reasoning without one crowding out the other. The resulting policies
are distinctive and wilfully avoidable, but the aim of guiding decision-makers
simultaneously towards and away from a policy goal risks ineffectiveness.
Conclusion
I have argued that two versions of the oxymoron objection continue to stalk the
debate over the possibility and permissibility of nudging. I have suggested that the
original motivational version of this objection, which denies the coherence of
libertarian paternalism, still requires resolution. Further, I have identified a broader
mechanical version of the objection that threatens nudging more generally. Many
policy interventions satisfy Sunstein and Thaler’s initial definition of a nudge. We
can further explain the distinctive features of these policies according to how they
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employ what I have called friction costs. This explanation seeks to show that
although nudges do not rely on the traditional social or economic costs involved in
incentives and sanctions, they do rely on certain psychological costs to shape our
behaviour. Thinking of nudges in terms of friction costs helps to focus on this
important feature.
This explanation allowed us to categorise nudges according to how they employ
friction costs. I then suggested that each category of intervention faces its own
problem. Nudges are supposed to be distinctive because they are both effective and
avoidable, but closer study suggests this initially appealing definition rings false.
Few nudge interventions will simultaneously enjoy all of these characteristics.
This is due to the existence of three related problems:
The Problem of Avoidability—Imposing significantly high friction costs offers
policy-makers a distinctive method of effectively changing our behaviour.
However, these costs crowd out our reflective system of thought and make it
difficult to avoid policy interventions wilfully.
The Problem of Distinctiveness—Imposing moderate friction costs in order to
trigger both systems of thought towards the same policy goal promises to effectively
change our behaviour in a wilfully avoidable manner. However, these interventions
are indistinguishable from other forms of evidence-based policy interventions.
The Problem of Effectiveness—Imposing moderate friction costs in order to trigger
both systems of thought in different directions promises to secure wilful avoidance
through distinctive means. However, these interventions are an ineffective means of
securing policy goals.
These problems create:
The Choice Architect’s Trilemma—A nudge will be either wilfully unavoidable,
indistinct from other policies, or ineffective at securing policy outcomes.
This trilemma sets up the path between three pitfalls that choice architects must
navigate. It also explains (and supports) Sunstein’s recent call to move away from
general abstract discussion of nudging. If nudges shared a more detailed series of
definitional characteristics, then such a discussion would be useful. However, in the
absence of a more detailed definition that avoids the conceptual objections raised
here, general abstract discussion is difficult.
The choice architect’s trilemma establishes a difficult choice for academics:
either we need further definitional clarity to engage in abstract argument or we must
acknowledge that the definition of a nudge is largely vacuous and we should
proceed with a more specific case-by-case debate. The trilemma also establishes a
difficult choice for policy-makers: if nudges are to be treated as a distinctive type of
policy intervention, then they are either not the cheap and effective silver bullets
that policy-makers desire (because they are less effective than advertised), or they
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are more restrictive than commonly accepted (because they are more difficult to
wilfully avoid than advertised).
So long as these tensions remain unresolved, critics can continue to dismiss the
nudge project as oxymoronic because few interventions can claim to possess all
three characteristics that nudges should possess. Most nudges will fall foul of one of
the problems identified above. How problematic these problems turn out to be will
depend on how we value these conflicting elements and the extent to which we wish
to engage with the issues that they raise. However, in order to make this evaluative
judgement, we must first understand the conceptual terrain that academics and
policy-makers are attempting to traverse. I have argued that this terrain is far more
treacherous than many fellow travellers realise.
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